We examine the potential profits of trading on a measure of private information (pin) in a stock. A zero-investment portfolio which is size neutral, but long in high pin stocks and short in low pin stocks earns a significant abnormal return. The Fama-French, momentum and liquidity factors do not explain this return. However, significant covariation in returns exists among high pin stocks and among low pin stocks, suggesting that pin might proxy for an underlying factor. We create a pin factor as the monthly return on the zero-investment portfolio above and show that it is successful in explaining returns to independent pin-size portfolios. We also show that it is robust to inclusion of the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor and the Amihud illiquidity factor.
I. Introduction
Despite what would seem to be a natural affinity between microstructure and asset pricing, the research in each area has remained largely disparate. Asset pricing research focuses on the role of market and other aggregate risks; microstructure has largely examined asset-specific or idiosyncratic adjustment of prices. This specialization has resulted in lacunae in each area: asset pricing models have difficulty in explaining asset returns, while microstructure models have been viewed as irrelevant for all but the very short-run behavior of asset prices.
Recent research has attempted to bridge these fields by demonstrating that microstructure-related concepts such as liquidity and asymmetric information may play a role in explaining the cross-section of asset returns. The liquidity-based research (see for example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) ; Amihud (2002) ; Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) or Acharya and Pedersen (2005) ) has typically found that liquidity, measured in a variety of ways, plays an economically significant role in influencing asset returns. What is less clear from this liquidity research is exactly what causes this relationship to arise, but potential explanations include inventory constraints on market makers or more general limitations on dealers risk-bearing capacity. Whatever the cause, research using the Pastor and Stambaugh factor (see Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) ) or the Amihud factor (see Charoenrook and Conrad (2004) ) supports the notion that liquidity may act as a factor in asset pricing.
In a related microstructure direction, researchers have shown that asymmetric information may play a role in the cross section of asset returns. Easley and O'Hara (2004) develop a theoretical model to show why equilibrium differences in asset returns will arise due to private information. The argument here is that asymmetric information creates a risk for uninformed traders because they are unable to optimally structure portfolios. While both informed and uninformed traders will optimally diversify, the uninformed do not know the correct (full information) weights to hold of each asset and so in equilibrium end up holding "too much" of the bad assets and "too little" of the good assets, setting the stage for information risk to affect asset returns. Garleanu and Pedersen (2004) provide an alternative but related private information explanation for asset return effects.
Empirically, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) show that the effect predicted by the EOH model is found in asset returns. Using a measure of private information (pin) derived from a microstructure model, these authors find striking evidence that information risk is priced. Specifically, results from cross-sectional asset pricing regressions indicate that a 10% increase in pin (approximately a two standard deviation move) gives rise to an increase in annual expected returns of 2.5%. This cross-sectional regression approach controls for the effect of other characteristics on returns, but it does not directly control for sensitivity of returns to standard risk factors. While there is an unresolved debate as to whether characteristics or factor sensitivities are more important in explaining the cross section of returns (see, e.g., Daniel and Titman (1997) ; Davis, Fama, and French (2000) ; Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005) ), the factor sensitivities are more appealing as controls for undiversifiable risk. Moreover, developing a factor approach to testing for information risk permits the comparison and inclusion of both an information factor and a liquidity factor into asset pricing investigations.
information and liquidity into returns can improve our understanding of both short-run and long-run asset pricing behavior. This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a basic derivation of the pin model. Section III then sets out the estimation technique and the data we use in this paper. Section IV examines the role of pin in explaining cross-sectional returns by looking at whether portfolios based on sorts over pin earn differential returns. Section V investigates the role of pin as a factor. We create a pin-factor, and we investigate its performance relative to the Fama-French, momentum plus liquidity model. The paper's last section is a conclusion.
II. The PIN Model
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the probability of information-based trade (pin) for each stock in our sample. As information-based trade is not directly observable, we use a structural microstructure model to make inferences about it. Microstructure models can be viewed as learning models in which market makers watch market data and draw inferences about the underlying true value of an asset. Crucial to this inference problem is the market maker's estimate of the probability of trade based on private information about the stock. Market makers watch trades, update their beliefs about this private information, and set trading prices. We model the trading process and the market maker's learning process and use this structural model, along with trade data, to make an inference about the probability of information-based trade.
We follow Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) in modeling a market in which our analysis. Surprisingly, Duarte and Young (2007) find that the liquidity measure ILLIQ is priced in Fama-MacBeth regressions over their similar sample period. a competitive market maker trades a stock with informed and uninformed traders.
Trade occurs over t = 1, . . . , T discrete trading days and, within each trading day, trade occurs in continuous time. Information events occur between trading days with probability α. When an information event occurs it is either bad news, with probability δ, or good news with probability, 1 − δ. Good news at date t is that the asset is worth V t , and bad news at date t is that it is worth V t .
During any trading day orders arrive at the market according to Poisson processes.
The market maker sets prices to buy or sell at each time during the day, and then executes orders as they arrive. Traders informed of bad news sell and those informed of good news buy. We assume that orders from the informed traders follow a Poisson process with daily arrival rate µ. Uninformed traders trade for liquidity reasons. We assume that buy and sell orders from uninformed traders arrive at the market according to independent Poisson processes with daily arrival rates ε b for buy orders and ε s for sell orders. If an order arrives at some time, the market maker observes the trade (either a buy or a sale), and he uses this information to update his beliefs. New prices are set, trades evolve, and the price process moves in response to the market maker's changing beliefs.
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Suppose we now view this problem from the perspective of an econometrician.
If we, like the market maker, observed a particular sequence of trades, what could we discover about the underlying structural parameters and how would we expect prices to evolve? This is the intuition behind a series of papers by O'Hara (1996, 1997a,b) , and Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) who demonstrate how to use structural models to provide specific estimates of the risks of information-based trading in a stock. They show that these structural models can be estimated via maximum likelihood, providing a method for determining the probability of information-based trading in a given stock.
The first step in the estimation is to note that the total number of buys and sells per day is a sufficient statistic for the trade data. This occurs because of the assumption that arrivals follow independent Poisson processes. The likelihood function induced by this model for the total number of buys and sells on a single trading day is
where (B, S) is the total number of buys and sells for the day and θ = (µ, b , s , α, δ) is the parameter vector. This likelihood function is a mixture of three Poisson probabilities, weighted by the probability of having a "good news day" α(1 − δ), a "bad news day" αδ, and a "no news day" (1 − α).
The model assumes that each day the arrivals of an information event and trades, conditional on information events, are drawn from identical and independent distributions. Thus the likelihood function for T days is a product of the above likelihood over days. The log likelihood function, after dropping a constant term and rearranging, can be written as
where This is important for stocks which have a large number of buys and sells as otherwise we would need to compute small fractions (arrival rates) taken to large powers (numbers of trades).
We now turn to the economic use of our structural parameters. The estimates of the model's structural parameters can be used to construct the theoretical opening bid and ask prices. As is standard in microstructure models, a market maker sets trading prices such that his expected losses to informed traders just offset his expected gains from trading with uninformed traders. This balancing of gains and losses is what gives rise to the "spread" between bid and ask prices. The opening spread is easiest to interpret if we express it explicitly in terms of this information-based trading. It is straightforward to show that the probability that the opening trade is information-based, pin, is
where αµ + ε b + ε s is the arrival rate for all orders and αµ is the arrival rate for information-based orders. The ratio is thus the fraction of orders that arise from informed traders or the probability that the opening trade is information-based. In the case where the uninformed are equally likely to buy and sell (ε b = ε s = ε) and news is equally likely to be good or bad (δ = 0.5), the percentage opening spread is
where Σ is the spread, ask minus bid price, and V * t is the unconditional expected value of the asset given by V * t = δV t + (1 − δ)V t . The opening spread is therefore directly related to the probability of informed trading. Note that if pin equals zero, either because of the absence of new information (α = 0) or traders informed of it (µ = 0), the spread is also zero. This reflects the fact that only asymmetric information affects spreads when market makers are risk neutral.
Neither the estimated measure of information-based trading nor the predicted spread is related to market maker inventory because these factors do not enter into the model. Instead, these estimates represent a pure measure of the risk of private information. More complex models can also be estimated, allowing for greater complexity in the trading and information processes. O'Hara (1996, 1997a,b) , Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) , and Easley, O'Hara, and Paperman Whether asymmetric information also affects required asset returns is the issue of interest in this paper. The model and estimating procedure detailed above provide a mechanism for determining the probability of information-based trading, and it is this pin variable that we explore in an asset pricing context in Section IV of this paper.
III. Data and Estimation of PIN
We estimate our model for the sample of all ordinary common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange for the years 1983 − 2001.
We focus on nyse-and amex-listed stocks because the market microstructure of those venues most closely conforms to that of our structural model. We exclude reits, stocks of companies incorporated outside of the U.S, and closed-end funds. We also exclude a stock in any year in which it did not have at least 60 days with quotes or trades, as we cannot estimate our trade model reliably for such stocks. Further, since we form portfolios based on year-end firm size, we exclude stocks for which this information is not available. In addition, we eliminate stocks with a year-end price below $ The likelihood function (2) depends upon the number of buys and sells each day for each stock in our sample. Transactions data gives us the daily trades for each of our stocks, but we need to classify these trades as buys or sells. To construct this data, we first retrieve transactions data from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (issm) and Trade And Quote (taq) datasets. We then classify trades as buys or sells according to the Lee-Ready algorithm (see Lee and Ready (1991) ). This algorithm is standard in the market microstructure literature and it essentially uses trade placement relative to the current bid and ask quotes to determine trade direction. Using this data,
we maximize the likelihood function over the structural parameters, θ = (α, µ, ε b , ε s , δ), for each stock separately for each year in the sample period. This gives us one yearly estimate per stock for each of the underlying parameters. We then compute yearly pins for each stock using the formula in equation (3).
The maximum likelihood estimation converges for almost all stocks. Panel A of Table 1 lists the number of stocks for which we could estimate the likelihood function each year, and which also had year-end price data in crsp. Of over 38, 000 stock-years, 3 In previous research we estimated pins up to 1998. The inclusion of the three additional years in this data set creates significant computational difficulties because of the increased number of trades in later years. But as we want to use pin in asset pricing tests it is important to have as long a time series as possible.
we were able to obtain pin estimates for all but 427. These failures were generally due to days of extremely high trading volume, which caused computational underflow in the optimization program. This issue occurs primarily in the last six years of the sample, coinciding with the advent of small day traders and the growth in automated trading, both of which have resulted in a marked increase in the number of trades. Furthermore, this occurs almost exclusively for the largest stocks rather than for smaller stocks. For instance, Table 1 shows that while only 45 of the 1871 stocks (2.4%) in the 2001 sample do not obtain pin estimates, these stocks account for 23.8% of the total market capitalization in our 2001 sample. This suggests that care is warranted in interpreting the asset pricing results for large stocks. We also suspect that the microstructure model provides a better description of the information environment among smaller stocks. For instance, the assumption that information events occurs only once per day seems plausible for smaller stocks, but less so for large stocks with thousands of trades per day.
[ Table 1 approximately here]
Summary statistics for the pin estimates are provided in Panel B of Table 1 . We computed yearly statistics, and the table reports the minimum, mean, and maximum across years of these statistics. For instance, the average of the yearly cross-sectional median pins is 0.194. The means of the yearly 25th and 75th cut-off points are 0.153 and 0.246, respectively. So on average half of our stocks have pins between these two levels. In prior work we found a strong negative correlation between pin and firm size, defined as market value of equity at the beginning of the year. Table 1 reports the cross-sectional spearman correlation between pin and size. The mean of these correlations is −0.661.
IV. Tests on PIN-Size Portfolios
Previous research has shown that size is an important determinant of excess returns (see Banz (1981) ; Barry and Brown (1984) ; French (1992, 1993) ). Size also plays an indirect role in our information-based explanation of why pin matters for returns. If, as suggested by Barry and Brown (1984) , size proxies for the total amount of information available about a stock, then controlling for size, pin should proxy for how this total information is divided between public and private information. 4 Indeed, in the model of Easley and O'Hara (2004) , both the amount of total information and the fraction of the information that is private affect expected returns. By first sorting stocks into portfolios according to size and then according to pin, we hold the amount of total information approximately constant across pin portfolios. Therefore, by analyzing the return differences across pin portfolios within each size category, we investigate whether the split between public and private information affects expected returns, as proposed by Easley and O'Hara (2004) .
At the beginning of each year, we sort stocks into size deciles based on market capitalization at the end of the prior year, and within each size decile, we sort into three portfolios based on the pins estimated over the prior year, ranging from the lowest one-third of pins to the highest one-third of pins. This sequential sorting procedure produces 30 portfolios with an approximately equal number of stocks in each portfolio.
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The results of the sorting procedure are reported in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 approximately here] Panel A of Table 2 reports the average pin for stocks in each portfolio. As expected within each pin classification, average pin decreases uniformly as we move from small to large stocks. Within size classifications, pin increases as we move from low to high pin stocks. This change is much larger for small size categories than it is for large size categories. For the smallest stocks the average pin changes from 0.20 for low pin to 0.39 for large pin; while for the largest stocks it changes from 0.09 to 0.16. Most large stocks have small pins, so creating significant variation within this group is not possible. Because the change in pin is small for large stocks we do not expect to find significant variation in returns as we move across pin categories for large stocks.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the average size for stocks in each portfolio. Again as expected within each size classification, average size generally decreases as we move from low to high pin. However, in percentage terms the changes are large only for the largest size classification, reflecting that the very largest firms tend to have very low pins. To check on whether our results are due to a particular classification scheme or to correlation within categories we also considered a five by five size-pin sort and a ten by five size-pin sort. All of the results are similar for each classification scheme so we report only those for the ten by three size-pin sort.
Panel C of Table 2 reports value-weighted monthly returns for each portfolio.
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These returns are the time series average of the monthly returns on each portfolio. The differences of the returns on high and low pin portfolios are positive and significant for the three smallest size deciles. They are 0.74, 0.77 and 0.57 with t-values of 2.63, 3.14 and 2.72, for the three smallest size deciles. The remaining differences vary in sign and are insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that the degree of asymmetric information, or at least our estimated pin, only affects expected returns among small stocks.
7 Table 2 also provides the mean return on a composite zero-investment portfolio (denoted pinf) formed by taking long (short) positions of equal size in the 10 high (low) pin portfolios. The mean monthly return on this portfolio is 0.26%, and the corresponding t-value is 2.78. This abnormal return is thus both economically and statistically significant. Using the theory in Easley and O'Hara (2004) we interpret the return on this zero-investment portfolio as a return earned for bearing an informationbased risk. To further examine this risk, and to ask whether it can be explained by other standard risk factors, in the next section we conduct a factor analysis of this return. Fama and French (1993) find that the returns on three factor-mimicking portfolios, constructed as the overall stock market portfolio (r M ), a portfolio long small firms and short large firms (smb), and a portfolio long firms with high book-to-market equity (be/me) and short low be/me firms (hml), contributes to explaining average returns on stock portfolios. The three factor model, however, does not explain the returns to momentum portfolios (see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ; Fama and French (1996) ; Grundy and Martin (2001) ) or liquidity portfolios (see Pástor and Stambaugh 7 Since pin is measured with error it could be that pin actually matters across all size categories, but either our measurements are more noisy for large stocks or the effects are smaller for large stocks and are overwhelmed by the noise. period. Both the Pástor and Stambaugh and the Amihud measure rely on daily rather than intradaily data. Therefore, while the measures are likely to be relatively coarse, they do provide the ability to investigate the effect of liquidity in long-horizon asset pricing studies.
V. Factor Tests

10
8 The Pastor-Stambaugh measure is akin to measuring the temporary price effects that arise due to illiquidity in a market. Microstructure research typically divides total price effects of trading into a permanent component (due to information) and a temporary component (due to liquidity). A price reversal is consistent with these temporary effects. 9 The Amihud measure is similar to a Kyle λ, which is simply the price change divided by the volume. In the Kyle model, the presence of informed traders causes λ to be positive while if there is no asymmetric information then λ is zero. The Amihud measure will thus pick up both information effects and other liquidity-related effects such as inventory pressures, tick size constraints, and the like. 10 Indeed, Amihud (2002, p. 32) stresses that the Amihud illiquidity measure was designed for situations where detailed microstructure data was not available, noting that "there are finer and better
It is conceivable that pin is correlated with beta, book-to-market, momentum and liquidity, as well as with size, so that the returns being earned on pin portfolios are just compensation for risk already captured by the Fama-French, momentum and liquidity factor-mimicking portfolios. The time-series correlations between these factors and our composite portfolio, pinf, which is long high-pin and short low-pin stocks, are given in Table 3 . 11 The highest correlation between the returns of pinf and another factor is the correlation of 0.55 with the momentum factor, umd. Because umd also has a high average return of 0.99, it appears to be the variable most likely to explain the returns to the pin portfolios. The correlations with the remaining factors are relatively low, and none of the mean factor returns are significant at the 5% level.
[ Table 3 approximately here]
The lack of significance for the means of the psliq and illiq factors might seem surprising, given the evidence in Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) To investigate whether the Fama-French, momentum and liquidity factors jointly can explain the apparent effect of pin on returns, we regress the time series of monthly returns for each of the 10 zero-investment pin portfolios, R i , on the Fama-French, momentum and liquidity factors:
The results of this regression are reported in Table 4 . The most important coefficients are the intercepts. If the factors explain the returns on our portfolios then the intercepts should be indistinguishable from zero. For the three portfolios involving the smallest stocks (where we have significant variation in pin and significant differences in raw returns) the intercepts are positive, large and significantly different from zero.
For these portfolios the intercepts are 0.83, 0.64, and 0.53 with t-values of 2.96, 2.78 and 2.68, respectively. For portfolios of larger stocks the intercepts are smaller, and none of them are significant. We also tested the null hypothesis that the intercepts are jointly equal to zero using the F-test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) . The GRS statistic has a p-value of 0.015. So the null hypothesis is rejected.
[ Table 4 approximately here] The column labeled All of Table 4 also reports the results for regression (5) applied to the time series of monthly returns of the composite portfolio, pinf. 13 Here the intercept is 0.20 with a t-value of 2.43. Thus even after controlling for these six factors there is a significant return of 0.20% per month on our zero investment pinf portfolio that is unexplained.
14 Since existing factors do not explain the returns to pin-based portfolios we ask whether a pin factor can explain these returns. For pin to play a role as a statistical factor there must be common variation of returns within high pin stocks and within low pin stocks. Such common variation would increase the volatility of the zero-investment pin-based portfolios. Table 3 showed that the composite pin portfolio, pinf, has a standard deviation of monthly returns of 1.43%. This is quite low compared to the standard deviation of the umd portfolio of 4.52% or the psliq portfolio of 5.71%.
However, Table 5 shows that there is strong correlation in returns across the pin-based portfolios. Specifically, we find substantial correlation between returns to pin portfolios for smaller firms, and substantial correlation between returns to pin portfolios for larger firms. For example, the correlation in returns between size portfolios 1 and 2 is 0.32, and between portfolios 9 and 10 it is 0.46. However, there is little or even negative covariation in returns between small and large firm pin portfolios. Perhaps small and large firm pin portfolios are responding to different, but correlated within size groups, 13 The construction of this zero-investment portfolio which is long high-pin stocks and short low-pin stocks is described in Table 2. 14 We have also checked that the effect of pin is not a January effect. Excluding the month of January from the regression (5) actually yields a higher intercept of 0.28 (t-statistics 3.52) on the composite portfolio. The average monthly return on the composite portfolio outside January is 0.37% (t-statistics 4.26).
information events. Regardless of the interpretation, this covariation provides support for a pin factor.
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[ Table 5 approximately here]
We cannot use the composite pin portfolio, pinf, to explain returns to the size portfolios as pinf is composed of an equal weighting of all of the size portfolios. Instead, we form pin factor-mimicking portfolios whose component stocks exclude the stocks in the portfolio whose return we are trying to explain. Specifically, for size portfolio i, a pin factor, pinf −i , is formed as the composite zero-investment portfolio used in Tables 2-4, except that zero-investment pin portfolio for size portfolio i is excluded from pinf −i . That is, for each of the nine size portfolios (excluding size portfolio i), two value-weighted portfolios are created based on the stocks in the low and high pin terciles, respectively. pinf −i is then created as the average of the returns on the nine high pin portfolio minus the average of the returns on the nine low pin portfolios. This ensures that there is no overlap between the stocks in the factor-mimicking portfolio and the portfolio whose returns we wish to explain. This procedure is obviously more demanding than simply forming one pin factor and using it for all size portfolios. Of course, one pin factor, such as pinf, could be used to help explain returns to other portfolios.
15 To give a perspective for the effect of the common variation within pin portfolios, we replicated the sorting procedure by assigning a generated random number to each of the sample stocks each year and substituting this variable for pin in the double-sorts. This procedure was repeated 50 times, and yielded an average standard deviation of returns on the composite portfolio of 0.72%. The standard deviation across the 50 runs of the computed portfolio standard deviation was 0.033%. Table 6 reports the results of the regressions
where pinf −i is the pin factor for portfolio i. The results provide strong support for the pin factor playing an important role in asset pricing. Looking first at the pin factor coefficient, we find all coefficients to be positive, and they are significant at the 5% level for eight of the ten size portfolios. Thus, sensitivity to the pin factor increases returns for stocks (or more precisely, portfolios) in accordance with our theory. That this effect is weaker for the largest stocks is consistent with findings in Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2007) that information risk is more important for smaller stocks. Second, we find that inclusion of the pin factor substantially reduces all of the intercepts relative to the results of Table 4 . The intercepts of the three smallest size portfolios remain positive and significant at the 5% level. None of the other intercepts are positive and significantly different from zero. These results suggest that adding the pin factor significantly reduces the unexplained portion of asset returns Finally, the R 2 values are also substantially higher when including the pin factor. The average R 2 across the ten portfolios is 0.20 in the 6-factor regressions in Table 4 , while it increases to 0.25 when including the pin factor in Table 6 .
[ Table 6 approximately here]
It is useful to compare our findings on the pin factor with those of the PastorStambaugh liquidity factor and the Amihud illiquidity factor. While the coefficients on the pin factor are uniformly positive, the coefficients on both liquidity factors are not.
The Amihud factor, for example, is negative for smaller stocks but generally positive for larger stocks, while the psliq factor shows no consistent pattern. Similarly, only three of the 10 coefficient values for the Amihud measure are statistically significant in either Table 6 (with the pin factor) or Table 4 (without the pin factor). The psliq factor shares a similar significance pattern. These results suggest that while liquidity may play a role in asset pricing, it clearly does not obviate the role played by information risk. Indeed, our strong findings on the pin factor clearly underscore that information risk is a factor in asset pricing.
In summary, our findings are twofold. First, the Fama-French, momentum and liquidity factors do not explain the differences in average returns across pin-sorted portfolios. Secondly, a factor-mimicking portfolio based on pin has good ability to capture those return differences, even when the factor-mimicking portfolio contains none of the stocks in the portfolios whose returns are explained. Still, the pin-factor fails to completely explain the returns to pin-sorted portfolios among the smallest stocks.
VI. Conclusion
We show that zero-investment portfolios based on pin sorts earn significant abnormal returns that cannot be explained by the Fama-French factors or by a momentum factor.
Moreover, we find that significant covariation in returns exists among pin portfolios, suggesting that pin might proxy for an underlying factor in returns. Consequently, we form a factor-mimicking portfolio based on pin, and find that indeed it helps to explain the returns to these portfolios, though it is unable to fully explain the return differences across pin portfolios among the smallest stocks.
Our results show that pin affects returns and that a pin-based factor performs as well as other factors in a standard multifactor model designed to explain differences in returns. Our results thus join a growing literature showing that microstructure variables influence long-term asset returns. How best to measure such microstructure influences remains a source of discussion, but we would argue that our results here suggest that liquidity and information risk play distinctive roles in this price process.
With regard to the pin factor, a natural goal is to understand how such a factor role arises. Certainly, a first step is to provide a theoretical explanation of why this effect occurs. This cannot be done with standard CAPM or CCAPM models as pin derives from an economy in which traders have differential information. If one builds a model without differential information, or one in which all traders have in equilibrium common information, then pin cannot matter. We believe that asset pricing models in which differential information remains as an equilibrium phenomenon are more natural than those in which it never exists or disappears. Easley and O'Hara (2004) constructed such a model to explain how pin as a characteristic could be priced in the cross section.
We are currently investigating whether such a model can provide a factor interpretation for pin.
Pástor, L., and R. and P99 refer to percentiles of the yearly cross-sectional distribution; std is the standard deviation;
CorrSz is the spearman correlation between firm size and pin. TABLE 3 Factor summary statistics
All statistics are based on monthly returns in 1984-2002 of the Fama-French, momentum, liquidity, and pin factor portfolios: market excess return (r M ), small stock returns minus large stock returns (smb), high book-to-market stock returns minus low book-to-market stock returns (hml), past 1-year winner stock returns minus past loser stock returns (umd), the returns on high liquidity betas stocks minus returns on stocks with low liquidity betas (psliq) as constructed by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) , the returns on high Amihud illiquidity stocks minus returns on low illiquidity stocks as constructed by Charoenrook and Conrad (2004) , and high pin stock returns minus low pin stock returns (pinf). The construction of the pinf portfolio is explained in TABLE 4 Fama-French 6-factor regressions
The time series of zero-investment portfolio returns, R i , is created as explained in Table 2 , and the following regression is performed for each portfolio i:
The TABLE 6 Fama-French 7-factor regressions with PINF
The 
